Abstract. Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is an automatic identification technology. In recent years, more and more applications have been found for its use. However, there are still many security issues worth discussing. In this paper, we propose a mutual authentication scheme, which can solve problems such as privacy, replay attack, forward security, and user location privacy. In our scheme, we only use the tag for the purposes of being a storage media based on EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 (C1G2) standards. Analysis shows that the proposed scheme can resist known attacks and can be used in light-weight RFID systems of the current low-cost tags.
It means that the attacker knows the user's location. The reason that causes this security problem is that the attacker gets a response message from the tag. Although the tag transfers the encrypted message to a legitimate reader, the attacker still can get user's location by use of a multi-reader to query RFID tags at different locations.
(4) Resist replay attack [3] When a reader wants to query a tag, the attacker will intercept the message between a legitimate reader and a legitimate tag, and then the attacker will be able to transmit intercepted message to spoof the tag or server to pass authentication.
(5) Forward secrecy [16] An attacker listens to iteration between a legitimate reader and a legitimate tag and stores the messages. Then, the tag, which is not resistant to physical attacks, is compromised with the EPC being obtained by the attacker. At this point, the attacker will be able to obtain the secret keys and to generate future message (6) Man-in-the-middle attack [3, 6, 17] Attacker can hold and modify the messages between tags and readers by intercepting the exchanged messages between a legitimate reader and a legitimate tag.
Recently, the RFID Class 1 Generation 2 (C1G2) standard was issued by EPCglobal. The main property is briefly summarized in the following:  The RFID tag is passive, and its power is triggered by the readers.  The RFID tag communicates at UHF band (800-960 MHz) and its communication range is from 2 m to 10 m.  The RFID tag only supports on-chip 16-bit Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG), and the 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) checksum is used to detect errors in transmission data.  The RFID's privacy protection mechanism is to make the tag permanently unusable once it receives the kill command with a valid 32-bit kill PIN (e.g., tags can be killed at the point-of-sale).  Read/write to the RFID tag's memory is allowed only after it is in secure mode (i.e., after receiving the access command with a valid 32-bit access PIN).
To overcome the security threats, several protocols [1, 11, 12, 16] were proposed to enhance the RFID security. The RFID tags can only be considered as storage media. Thus, the computation ability is limited. There are about 500-5000 logic gates in current RFID tags. Thus, the traditional encryption and hash function mechanisms [10, 11, 15] are infeasible for EPCglobal C1G2 RFID tags.
In addition, plenty of literature reviews [14, 18] mentioned RFID tag related sources. Only a few proposed schemes [2, 3, 7, 12] can be implemented on EPCglobal C1G2 RFID tags. In 2009, Pedro et al. [16] proposed a cryptanalysis of a novel authentication protocol conforming to EPCglobal C1G2 RFID standard. Peris-Lopez et al. [16] showed various major security flaws in Chien et al.'s proposal. They show that none of the protocol objectives are met. It is vulnerable to attacks including unequivocal identification, tag impersonation, back-end database impersonation, back-end database autodesynchronization, and tracking problem.
In this paper, we design a novel mutual authentication scheme for RFID EPCglobal class 1 generation 2 standards. The proposed scheme can resist known attacks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The preliminaries will introduce the related Cyclic Redundancy Codes in Section 2. The proposed protocol is shown in Section 3. Security analysis and discussions are presented in Section 4. Finally, some concluding remarks are drawn in Section 5.
Preliminaries
We will introduce the related EPCglobal C1G2 standards, Cyclic Redundancy Codes operation and properties in this section.
EPCglobal C1G2 standards
In the EPCglobal C1G2 standards, the computing resources of tags are limited. The tags only can operate CRC functions, simple logic operations, and generate random numbers; other complex operations (such as hash functions, symmetric encryption, and asymmetric encryption) cannot conform to the standards. According to the EPCglobal C1G2 standards, the RFID tag stores two keys in the tag: the kill key ( ): the key is used to write data to the EPCglobal C1G2 RFID tag's memory.
Cyclic Redundancy Codes -CRCs
The Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) [5] is a checksum algorithm which is used to detect data errors during transmission. The CRC checksum is computed as a remainder of the division of the original data by the CRC polynomial
The mathematics of CRCs
The hardware does not need strong computation power for a CRC operation. An n-bit CRC consists of an n-bit shift with some XOR gates. Computing the CRC is as follows: .That is, computing the CRC of a polynomial
The mechanism of computing an n-bit binary CRC is simple. Here is the first calculation for computing a 2-bit CRC:
If the input stream of the leftmost divisor bit is 1, then the divisor is exclusive-ORed into the input stream. The divisor is then shifted one bit to the right, and the process is repeated until the divisor is equal to the right-hand end of the input stream. The following representation is the final result: 00000000010100 ← result of penultimate calculation
The detailed explanations of the CRC polynomial ) ( x d are described in Duc et al.' scheme [7] . 
. (2) ▼Proof. From the definition in Eq. (1) above, one can write:
, substituting these values in the left-hand of Eq. (2) we obtain the following:
Rearranging terms in this expression we get:
That is, the corresponding expression is
(analogously to Eqs. (3) and 4).
Corollary 1.
In particular, if in Eq. (2) we have c a  , then ) (
On the basis of the above property, we will propose a provable RFID mutual authentication scheme that conforms to the EPCglobal C1G2 standards and improves security.▲
Our scheme
We will propose a novel scheme for RFID systems to improve the security performance based on the EPCglobal C1G2 standard. The scheme involves three entities: tag (T), reader (R) and back-end server (S). We assume the communication channel is secure between the back-end server and the reader, but it is insecure between the tag and reader. It is susceptible to all possible attacks.
The proposed scheme is divided into two phases: (1) Initialization phase (2) Mutual authentication phase. 
Notation

Mutual authentication phase
In this phase, the tags and the servers can perform the mutual authentication procedures. The tags and the servers can verify whether they are legal or not by working with each other. We illustrate the authentication scenario in Figure 1 . The pseudonym and key updating procedures also must be executed for each transaction.
Step 1: When the reader wants to access a tag, it generates N 1 and computes
Then it sends the request message M req and A to the tag. Step 2: Upon receiving the request message, the tag generates a nonce N 2 and computes X, B and C T as follows:
) to the reader.
Step 3: After receiving the tag's response, the reader will involve A and its identity RID i into the transmission messages and forward ) , , , , (
to the server.
Step 4: When the server received the authentication request from the reader, the server checks whether X and ' B as follows:
Then the server will verify whether T C is correct or not as follows:
If the equality holds, the server computes Y, 1 C and S C as follows:
. (18) Moreover, the server updates the pseudonym identification ( 
The server transmits the message
to the reader.
Step 5: After receiving the transmission messages ( 1 , C C S ), the reader forwards S C to the tag and obtains the product information DATA i as follows:
Step 6: Upon receiving the message S C of the reader, the tag uses the CRC function to verify the correctness as follows: 
Security analysis and discussions
In this section, we will examine and analyze whether the notable security requirements are satisfied or not.
Security analysis
Resist forge tag attack
In order to accomplish this attack, an adversary only needs to listen to iterative messages between the reader and the legitimate tag.
Each tag shares with the private messages of the reader: EPC i , the kill key ( ), which is used to build messages A and T C . However, an attacker intercepts messages; she/he will be able to forge a legitimate tag. The following transmitted iteration messages can be intercepted by an attacker between the reader and the legitimate tag as follows:
(
Once the attacker holds the information of M req , A, C T , N 2 , and PID i , the attacker can build message 
In our scheme, the value B, which is involved with T C , is not transmitted between the reader and the tag. Therefore, the attacker cannot calculate the next correct ' T C value from the intercepted messages.
Resist forgery server attack
In this case, we will prove that our scheme can resist the forged server attacks as follows: For the attacker, she/he can listen to iteration messages between a legitimate tag and a server. However, an attacker will be able to supplant a legitimate server.
Step 1: R→T： M req , A
Step 2: T→R： C T , N 2 , PID i
Step 3:
Step 4: S→R： C S , C 1 Step 5 
If each of b and d is the concatenation of some other variables (b=b 1 ||b 2 , d=d 1 ||d 2 ), the above expression holds and can be rewritten as follows:
According to Corollary 1, the following expression can be derived 
So, the message ' S C is easily computed as follows: 
User location privacy
Although the attacker cannot obtain the plain text from the tag, the attacker still can trace the user's location when tags respond to the reader's queries with the same identifier.
The success of this attack depends on preventing tag key updating. If the attacker intercepts the messages between the reader and the legitimate tag, he or she is able to track the user's location for the following reason:
Step 1:
Now, the attacker intercepts the messages ( T C , ' ) between the tag and the reader, the attacker can spoof the server by transmitting previously obtained T C and A to pass the authentication. The scenario is described as follows:
The attacker intercepts the 1 st communication message:
Step 1:R→T：M req , A
Step 2:T→R：
The legitimate n th communication :
The attacker replays the previously obtained T C to pass authentication, but she/he will fail. From Corollary 1, the reason is described as follows: 
Forward secrecy
In this subsection, we will show that an attacker cannot compromise a tag and obtain its resident data; the attacker cannot obtain any secret information of the tags.
Suppose that an attacker listens to iteration
S C ) between a legitimate reader and a legitimate tag and stores these values. Then, the tag will suffer from the forward secrecy. Due to the EPC i being obtained by the attacker, she/he will be able to obtain the secret keys ( C . The detail scenario of this attack is described as follows:
Step 1: R→T：M req , ' A
Step 2: T→R： '
Step 3: R→T： ' S C From Corollary 1, the attacker obtains the transmitted messages between the server and reader, she/he will calculate
as follows: 
So, the message S C is easily computed as follows:
If an attacker can hold and modify the messages, the message ' S C is easily computed from Corollary 1 as follows: The reason is described as follows:
The attacker cannot calculate the next correct communication parameter ' S C from the intercepted message to spoof the tag.
Discussions
We compare the time complexity of the proposed scheme with those of the previous schemes during the mutual authentication phase in Table 1 . Because of the EPCglobal C1G2 standards only support simple operations, for example: exclusive-OR, random number generation and CRC operations for tag operation, and some previous schemes often used the symmetric or asymmetric cryptosystem to implement their applications. Therefore, these schemes do not conform to the EPCglobal C1G2 standards. These operations are not suitable to current low cost tag.
Simultaneously, the proposed scheme can resist various attacks and with mutual authentication. None of the previous methods can achieve the listed requirements, but our scheme achieves all requirements. We compare the security and property of our scheme with those of the previous schemes in table 2. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a mutual authentication protocol based on EPCglobal C1G2 standard to resist various attacks and it can enhance the security. Although several schemes have been proposed for RFID systems, only few schemes conform to the EPC C1G2 standard. Our scheme only uses simple operator (XOR and PRNG) on the tag, hence it is suitable for low-cost RFID.
To sum up, our scheme has achieved the following:
(1) Resist the forgery tag attack In summary, our scheme can be used in lightweight RFID systems that conform to EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 standards. The RFID system has attracted much attention and been applied to many applications, such as ownership transfer, manufacturing and inventory control can achieve a higher security in current low-cost tags.
